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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F· UTAH

J i\CK E. LAKE,
Pla.intiff, Respondent, and
Cross-Ap·pellant,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9382

ROBERT J. PINDER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF O·F RESP·O,NDENT
AND CROSS-APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND OF
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
We cannot agree with the statement of facts outlined in the appellant's brief. The facts as developed
at the trial of this case amply justify the findings of the
trial court and the judgment rendered on the question of
liability.
During the latter part of February, 1958, the defendant, Robert J. Pinder, met the plaintiff, Jack E. Lake,
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in J?enver, Colorado, to discuss two business propositions:
a) A joint venture between Lake and Pinder to exploit a franchise agreement owned by Lake to distribute
therapeutic massage equipment in the State of Texas
manufactured by Life Massage and Home Equipment
Company ; and,
b) The exchange of mining stock owned by Lake in
the L. H. & L. Mining Company for stock in the Standard Gilsonite Company, of which Pinder was the
president.
With respect to the former venture it was agreed by
Pinder that he would lend to the venture between
$10,000.00 and $15,000.00 as "\Vorking capital to reimburse Lake for expenses incurred in obtaining training in
Denver, his living expenses while organizing the business in the State of Texas, and for advertising and other
expenses of building a sales organization in Texas. It
was agreed that from the first profits from the venture
Pinder would first receive back the money loaned and
then the two would each draw an equal salary from the
company and divide any profits. (R-53, 57, 67, 68, 217,
218, 222, 223, 224) Pinder agreed to have his Texas law
firm incorporate the venture. (R-57) Pinder, pursuant
to this agreement, loaned $2,000.00 to the venture to
help pay the expenses and in addition paid to Stanley
Lake, the plaintiff's brother "\Yho owned the master franchise for the Western States, Hawaii, and Alaska, additional sums for advertising for salesmen in Texas, travel
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expenses, and other expenses aggregating approximately
$800.00. (R-226) Thereafter Pinder met Stanley Lake,
one of the three owners of the master franchise for the
Western States, Hawaii, and Alaska, and Jack Lake, the
plaintiff, in Houston, Texas, to plan the setting up of the
Texas operation. They had a prospective State Manager
travel from San Antonio to Houston for Pinder to
interview, and Pinder, after indicating his satisfaction
with the man, agreed to advance the candidate $400.00
expenses to go to Denver to be trained. (R-77, 78, 227,
228, 229) Pinder later advanced further funds from the
proceeds of the sale of certain Standard Gilsonite stock,
a transaction hereafter more fully described, and loaned
the proceeds to the venture but failed to advance the
funds agreed to be advanced and later refused to keep
his end of the bargain and announced to Stanley Lake in
a conversation in Salt Lake City that he would, if necessary, even deny ever being in Texas. (R. 234, 235) This
conversation with Stanley Lake is not denied by Pinder.
With respect to the exchange of L. H. & L. stock
owned by Jack Lake for Standard Gilsonite stock, an
agreement was signed by Pinder receipting for the L. H.
& L. stock and making Pinder a trustee for Lake to effect

the transaction. The document (Ex. -2) contains the
following language written in Pinder's own handwriting:
"I hand you forth,vith a receipt for 7,500 shares
(Seven Thousand Five Hundred) L. H. & L. mining stock as trustee to be delivered to Standard
Gilsonite upon payment of Thirty-Seven Thousand FiYe Hundred (37,500) shares of Standard
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stock. Said stock to be escrowed on delivery as
mutually agreed.
R. J. Pinder, President
Standard''
Pinder received possession of the stock, flew in his
private plane to Salt Lake City, Utah, and promptly violated the trust agreement by delivering the L. H. & L.
stock to Standard Gilsonite Company before receiving
the Standard stock owned by Lake.
Q. And what did you do with Mr. Lake's stock~
A. I brought it to Salt Lake, I believe that evening, and the next day gave it to the Treasurer of
Standard Gilsonite Company. (R-252, 253)

The plaintiff brought suit in June, 1958, and the defendant did not even cause the stock to be issued until
January 19, 1959, almost one year after the trust agreement was entered into. (R-157)
Pinder agreed at the time the transaction was made,
to sell the stock for Lake at the best possible price and
represented he had special knowledge of the market and
could get a better price for Lake than Lake could get for
himself. Lake agreed to escrow his stock \Vith Pinder and
to let him act as his trustee to sell the stock for him.
(R-62, 63, 215)
In April, 1958, Pinder explained to Jack Lake that
he wished to sell some of his (Pinder's) stock in order
to meet his commitment to Lake to put up the necessary
capital for the Life l\iassage franchise in Texas but that
it would embarrass him as President of Standard to have
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it appear to his investors that he was selling his own
stock at a cheap price, and asked Lake to let him borrow
some of his (Lake's) stock for delivery, and promised
to replace it.
''He said, after all, I am trustee for you. All I
have to do is transfer stock back into the account
for you." (R-74)
Lake agreed to let Pinder handle this transaction
and signed two letters authorizing Pinder to cause the
stock to be transferred to Pinder's buyers. Mr. Lake
received $4,000.00 from the first transaction which he
turned over to Pinder and $5,000.00 from the second sale
"~hich was put in the joint venture bank account. Pinder
advanced only about one-half the funds he agreed to
advance for the Texas venture and then took the position
that the stock had really been sold for the account of
Lake and denied any participation whatever in the Life
1\Iassage venture and refused to issue any stock whatever to Lake. Before trial the Standard Gilsonite Corporation, pursuant to a stipulated settlement, issued to
Lake 6,500 shares of stock as a settlement of its liability
and was dismissed. (R-6)
The trial court found in favor of Lake on all the
issues and fixed the damages at the price of the stock
when sold by Pinder to the Texas, Witherspoon and
McGee.
The defendant made a motion for a new trial and
among other points argued that the court erred in its
opinion that the endorsements on the back of the checks
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made payable to Lake as a loan to the Life Massage venture were put on after the checks were cashed. This was
argued at length to the trial judge who advised counsel
that the motion for a new trial did not properly raise
this issue and that this was immaterial to the decision in
any evtnt, since both sides agreed that the funds were
advanced as a loan and the court had found that these
funds were loaned pursuant to the agreement by Pinder
to finance the Life Massage venture and whether the
legend on the checks recited that the money was a loan
did not make any difference and that the court still chose
to believe the evidence given by the plaintiff and his witnesses rather than the defendant's evidence. The court
pointed out that if the defendant intended the motion for
a new trial to be based upon newly discovered evidence
no supporting affidavits were on file and the court could
not consider the suggestion that there was newly discovered evidence available.
The court further stated that it did not mean to
convey the impression that its decision was based upon
the presence of absence of the legend on the checks since
all agreed they were loans, and this would not effect
the court 's decision in the case even if the proper motion
had been made.
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the
trial court. The plaintiff cross-appealed from the conclusion of law and judgment on the sole ground that the
court erred in the determination of the measure of damages. At the trial the evidence showed that during 1958
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the stock rose to a price in excess of $2.50 per share during the year following the time Pinder refused to deliver
the stock to Lake. The trial judge fixed the damages as
of the day that Pinder had his stock transactions with
McGee and Witherspoon in March, 1958, instead of the
highest market price. The plaintiff contended that the
measure should have been of the highest market value
within a reasonable time after Pinder repudiated the
trust agreement in May, 1958, and refused to cause the
stock to be delivered to Lake.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I.

THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE
TRIAL COURT ARE ALL SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

PoiNT

II.

THE EVIDENCE AND THE UNCHALLENGED
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND JUDGMENTS.

PoiNT

III.

THE DEFENDANT- APPELLANT MADE NO
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND
OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE YET
ATTEMPTS TO PRESENT NEW EVIDENCE TO
THIS COURT ON APPEAL BY AFFIDAVIT AND
ARGUMENT IN HIS BRIEF.
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PoiNT

IV.

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED THE
PLAINTIFF THE HIGHEST MARKET PRICE OF
THE STOCK FROM THE TIME OF REFUSAL TO
DELIVER THE STOCK TO WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME THEREAFTER.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE
TRIAL COURT ARE ALL SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The appellant complains that the Findings of Fact
made by the trial judge are unsupported by the evidence
in five particulars. He apparently concedes that in all
other respects they are supported by substantial evidence. In the interest of clarity we will treat each objection as made.
' 'a) That the court erred in finding that the defendant agreed 'vith the plaintiff to deliver the
L. H. & L. stock 'only upon the payment to the
plaintiff of 37,500 shares of the capital stock of
Standard Gilsonite Company.' " (Appellant's
brief P-14)
The appellant abstracts only a portion of an isolated
statement from the record made by the plaintiff to attack
this finding. The finding is clearly supported by the
great weight of the evidence:
1. The trust agreement itself (Ex. -2) clearly states
that the L. H. & L. stock of Lake's is ''to be delivered to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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~tandard

Gilsonite upon payment of Thirty-seven Thousand Five Hundred shares (37,500) of Standard stock to
be escrowed on delivery as mutually agreed.'' This clearly empowers the trustee acting for Lake to deliver Lake's
stock only upon payment of the Gilsonite stock.
2. Jack Lake testified as follows :
''. . . he would not deliver my L. H. & L. stock
until he made sure they would issue the 37,500
shares \vhich he would hold for me because he had
a place on it and could sell it at places better than
the local brokers, so I signed a letter stating he
was acting as my trustee." {R-62)
The above was the explanation of the conversation
prior to executing the trust agreement. The DefendantAppellant Pinder drafted the trust agreement and the
terms are clear and unambiguous in regard to this point.
The plaintiff, Jack Lake, had no formal education except
grade school and relied upon Pinder to draft the agreement. {R-106) On cross-examination by the defendant's
attorney the plaintiff further explained his understanding of the trust agreement :

'' Q. What does the 'vord 'trustee' mean to you,
l\Ir. Lake~ Have you had any law training~'
A. Well, I never had any training. Well, in my
thinking it means you give to someone and you
trust him to hold it.
Q. With your L. H. & L. stock~
A.
ell, he gave me a letter to sign.

''r

Q. Well,
him \Yith?
to go get
.A.. \Y. ell,

this is \Yhat you were really trusting
Do you think the trustee is under a duty
your stock fro msomebody else~
he said he would.'' ( R-112, 113)
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The trust agreement also provided that the Gilsonite stock when issued would be escrowed with Pinder
to be sold for the benefit of Lake. The Defendant-Appellant does not challenge the portion of the paragraph 2 of
the Findings of Fact that Pinder agreed to act as a
trustee for Lake to receive Lake's stock and dispose of it
for Lake's benefit:
''The defendant requested that the plaintiff permit the defendant to receive the plaintiff's stock
to be issued in Standard Gilsonite Company as
trustee for the plaintiff, representing to the plaintiff that because of his peculiar and intimate
knowledge of the market for said stock, and of
the condition of Standard Gilsonite Company,
that he would be able to obtain the best possible
market price for said stock, and that he would
sell 15,000 shares of said stock for the plaintiff
at a minimum of $1.00 per share, and assured the
plaintiff that he would be able to sell the balance
of said stock from time to time at a substantially
higher price, and that the defendant would sell
the stock at the best possible price and remit the
proceeds to the plaintiff.'' (R-16)
Hence the Appellant at least admits that Pinder
agreed to obtain the stock for Lake and act in a fiduciary
capacity to sell it at the best market price for Lake's
benefit and that he guaranteed Lake at least $1.00 per
share on 15,000 shares and a higher price on the balance.
"b) That the court erred in finding 'that the defendant breached his trust agreement and delivered the plaintiff's L. H. & L. stock to Standard
Gilsonite Company immediately upon his return
to Salt Lake City from Denver, Colorado.'' (R-16)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

This finding is supported by Pinder's own testimony:

"Q. 1\nd \vhat did you do with Mr. Lake's stock~
A. I brought it to Salt Lake, I believe, that evening, and the next day gave it to the treasurer of
Standard Gilsonite Company.'' (R-252, 253)
This was a direct violation of the terms of the trust
agreement that the L. H. & L. stock was to be delivered
to Standard Gilsonite upon. payment of Thirty-seven
Thousand Five Hundred shares (37,500) of Standard
stock.'' Appellant argues in his brief that this was not
a breach because ''the evidence did not show there was
anything that would lead defendant to believe that Standard Gilsonite would not issue the 37,500 shares agreed
upon to plaintiff." (Appellant's brief P-15)
We submit that this excuse for the breach of trust is
no excuse at all. The delivery of the stock by the trustees
was a breach of the terms of his own agreement regardless of whether he anticipated that Standard Gilsonite
would not issue the stock. This agreement is particularly specious in the light of the fact that Pinder was the
chief executive officer of Standard. Appellant argues
that the failure to deliver the Standard stock was because
the secretary of Standard experienced some difficulties
in accomplishing transfer of the L. H. & L. stock. This
is a distortion of the record. The L. H. & L. stock was
transferred many months before any Standard stock \\'"as
issued to Respondent. Further, the trust agreement provided that the L. H. & L. stock would not even be delivered
until the Standard stock was issued.
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"c) That the court erred in finding that 'the defendant, Robert Pinder agreed with the plaintiff
that he would advance the venture $15,000.00 to
provide working capital for the organizational expenses, including the living expenses and expenses
already incurred by the plaintiff, Jack E. Lake
while in training with the Life Massage and Home
Equipment Company in Denver, Colorado. (T-17)
Appellant attacks this finding because there are
uncertain sums mentioned in the testimony as to the exact
amount that would be necessary to get the Texas franchise operating. At one time it was estimated that between $12,000.00 and $13,000.00 would be needed to safely
get the business going. (R-56) It was explained to Pinder
by Stanley Lake, owner of the Western States franchise,
that it might take as much as $15,000.00 to pay the expenses of getting the Texas franchise going. (R-222)
Pinder said ''there would be no difficulty whatsoever in
putting up that amount of money to finance the Texas
situation." (R-223)
We submit this point is of no consequence anyway.
It was agreed by Pinder that the $2,500.00 advanced to
Lake would come out of the profits of the Texas venture
(R-127) and was a part of the Pinder commitment:
''This $2,500.00 you are referring to "~as a portion
of the $12,000.00 or $13,000.00. This was a part of
this obligation. I had this obligation in order to
keep my franchise.'' (R-127)
The money advanced by Pinder consisted of $2,000.00
to Lake to take care of expenses incurred in his training
in Denver and Texas, $500.00 advanced to pay the exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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penses of Stanley J. Lake and approximately $300.00
in advertising and other expenses. (R-189, 242, 69)
''c) The court erred in finding 'that the defendant did not intend to deliver the stock to the plaintiff as agrPed but intended to defraud him of his
stock.' '' ( T-19)
Appellant objects to the above finding. While this
finding by the trial judge is not at all necessary to find
liability, it being sufficient to support the judgment that
the defendant simply failed to deliver the stock as agreed,
the evidence almost impels such a conclusion. The appellant does not challenge paragraph 2 of the findings and
these alone would be sufficient to justify such a conclusion
and alone would be sufficient to sustain the judgment.
The appellant further does not challenge the findings
made by the trial court contained in paragraphs 4, 5,
6, and 7, with the exception of the portions deleted hereafter and the above quoted findings respecting the intent
of Pinder. We submit that from the following portion of
the findings not challenged by appellant no other conclusions could be reasonably drawn:
4. That prior to the delivery to the defendant
of the L. H. & L. stock, the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement to establish a joint
venture for the sale of the products manufactured
by the Life Massage and Home Equipment Company under a franchise for the State of Texas.
Pursuant to this agreement the defendant adYanced the sum of $2,000.00. The defendant,
pursuant to the joint venture, requested that
the Company Sales l\Ianager and other perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sonnel from the Life Massage and Home
Equipment Company in Denver proceed to the
State of Texas and interview sales personnel there to obtain a State ~fanager. The defendant Pinder wired $500.00 to Denver to pay the
traveling expenses incurred by the home office personnel in traveling to the State of Texas, and paid
for the advertising to obtain personnel in Texas.
Subsequently the defendant Pinder met with the
plaintiff and with Stanley Lake in Houston, Texas,
for the purpose of setting up of the proposed
Texas organization, and did interview an individual from San Antonio who, it was agreed,
would go into training in Denver to prepare to
be the State Manager, and the defendant agreed
to pay his expenses. The defendant failed to advance any additional funds to the venture. The
defendant promised to have his attorneys in Dallas, Texas, set up a corporation to receive an
assignment of the franchise and to have his bookkeeper in Salt Lake City set up the books and
records for the venture, but did not do so.
5. That on or about the 4th day of April, 1958,
the defendant called the plaintiff on the telephone
and advised the plaintiff that he had a plan which
would enable him to put into the joint venture a
portion of the $15,000.00 agreed upon and asked
the plaintiff to meet him in Amarillo, Texas. At
that meeting he explained to the plaintiff that he
had large amounts of stock in Standard Gilsonite
Company but that as President of the Company
he could not sell the stock himself because it would
be embarrassing to him if it was kno"~n that he as
President of the Company 'Yas selling his stock,
and that if the plaintiff would authorize him to sell
some of his stock to the proposed buyers ""'ho ""'ere
already 8tockholders in the corporation he would
either deliver straight stock to fill the order or
would, if he used the plaintiff's stock, replace it
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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immediately with other stock, The plaintiff agreed
to permit the defendant to do this, and they went
to Hereford, Texas, to the offices of James W.
Witherspoon. The defendant went into conference
in the private office of James W. Witherspoon
and the plaintiff was left in the waiting room until
the transaction was completed. The plaintiff was
asked to sign a document authorizing the transfer
of 16,000 shares of the stock of Standard Gilsonite
Company and was given a check for $4,000.00.
Immediately after leaving the office of James W.
Witherspoon the defendant requested that the
check be endorsed over to him, which the plaintiff did. The plaintiff then asked the defendant
if he was not going to put the money into the
Life Massage and Home Equipment Venture, and
the defendant told the plaintiff that he needed
some of the money for a short time, and asked the
plaintiff how much money he needed to pay bills
incurred in the venture. The plaintiff indicated
that there were about $1,300.00 in bills incurred,
and the defendant then gave him his check for the
$1,300.00. At a subsequent meeting in Houston
in the Buffalo Inn Motel, the plaintiff and the
defendant discussed the progress of their business
Yenture, and the plaintiff advised the defendant
that they needed additional funds to carry on
the business. The defendant promised the balance of the $15,000.00 as agreed, and suggested
that the defendant would sell an additional 15,000
shares of stock to Mr. Witherspoon and associates at 30 cents a share. The defendant dictated
a document for the plaintiff to write and execute,
and showed the plaintiff how to execute a draft on
the said James W. Witherspoon. In both transactions the defendant assured the plaintiff that the
sale of the stock was a personal transaction bet,veen the defendant and the said Witherspoon and
associates, and that the plaintiff would receive his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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entire 37,500 shares of stock in due course. . . .
R-16, 17, 18,19, 20)
"f) That the court erred in finding that 'the
defendant did not cause the 37,500 shares of stock
due the plaintiff to even be issued until May of
1959. That he thereafter caused the stock to be
transferred to persons other than the plaintiff.' ''
(T-20)
The respondent concedes that the date of May should
have read January in the findings. This error has no
significance so far as the ultimate facts are concerned.
The undisputed fact is that the Appellant, Robert J.
Pinder, was the chief executive officer of Standard and
had the authority from both Standard and the Respondent Lake, to effect the transaction as agreed between
Standard and Lake. To deny that Pinder was not responsible for causing the stock to be transferred to persons
other than the plaintiff is to ignore the unchallenged portion of the trial court's findings of fact, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
cited above. Regardless of who actually had the duty in
Standard to do the clerical work incident to the actual
transfers of stock, this \\"'"as done under the authority of
the President and not the Secretary or the Office Manager, Borshard. The attempt to justify the failure of
Pinder to cause the stock to be issued as agreed cannot
be justified by reliance on the letter of authority to the
Hereford Bank (Ex. -21) or the stock povrer in Yiew of
the unchallenged findings contained in paragraph 5
(Supra) ""here the court found the letter and stock power
",.ere given to assist Pinder to raise funds to buy into the
Texas franchise and that Pinder promised to issue the
stock to Lake and to take the trade himself. These
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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undisputed findings show that Lake, by executing the
documents (Ex. -21, 22), did not intend to give up any
rights as contended for by appellant.

PoiNT

II.

THE EVIDENCE AND THE UNCHALLENGED
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND JUDGMENTS.
The appellant takes exception to the findings of fact
made by the trial judge in six particulars (see exceptions
numbered A to F, at pages 14, 15, 16, and 17 of Appellant's brief). The remainder of the findings are not challenged and these findings alone justify the conclusions
of law and judgment made by the trial court.
The court found that the defendant Pinder agreed
to deliver the plaintiff's L. H. & L. stock only when
Standard Gilsonite Company had issued in payment
37,500 shares of Standard Gilsonite stock. Pinder further
agreed to handle the sale of this stock as trustee for Lake
and to sell it at the best possible prices and even guaranteed to sell15,000 shares at not less than $1.00 per share.
(R-16)
The defendant protests that Pinder could not be a
trustee because there was not yet any stock issued to
Lake and therefore there 'vas no trust res. This contention is without merit on two grounds :
1. Pinder held the authority from Lake to act as
trustee in his stead to receive the 37,500 shares of stock.
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We have no argument as to the general proposition of
law cited from the Restatement of Trusts, Vol. 1, Sec. 75,
at page 20 of appellant's brief, but this has no application here. Lake had a contractual right to receive 37,500
shares of Standard Gilsonite stock and Pinder had agreed
to act as trustee for Lake to obtain this stock. Pinder was
trustee of this right and had a duty to carry out the trust
agreement made with Lake. He occupied the position of
chief executive officer of Standard and it was within his
power to have it issued - the Board of Directors having
already approved the issuance of the stock. A trust can
be created of a right arising out of contract just as well
as of any other property.
'' Thns, it is held that a trust may exist in a bond,
chose in action, contingent interests, expectancies .... (emphasis supplied) 89 C. J. C. No. 24,
Page 740.
We do not see how the defendant can seriously contend that a trustee appointed and agreeing to execute a
valuable contractual right, i. e., to receive stock his beneficiary is entitled to, and who is further empowered to
sell that stock for the benefit of another, can deny his
fiduciary capacity and duties because he causes the stock
to be issued to others !
2. Regardless of this argument with respect to the
existence of a trust the undisputed findings and the eYidence conclusively show that Pinder agreed to obtain
the stock for Lake and to dispose of it for Lake's benefit
and he breached this agreement. The conclusion of la"'
is supported by this finding also. The argument that
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this is a gratuitous offer to create a trust and therefore
without consideration, does not apply here. In this case
Pinder extracted an agreement from Lake that he would
allow Pinder to sell the stock for him so as not to harm
the market for the stock which Pinder was anxious to
establish for his own benefit as a major stockholder in
the company:
''As we agreed,'' he says, ''you won't go out
naturally and dump this stock on the market. We
are trying to build a market.'' ... ''He said this
market was supposed to be around $3.00 about
the last of March or middle of April.'' (R-62) ...
he would not deliver my L. H. & L. stock until he
made sure they would issue 37,500 shares which
he would hold for me because he had a place on it
and could sell it at places better than local
brokers.'' (R-62)
In addition to the above Lake agreed to allow Pinder to benefit personally from the arrangement by assigning part of his right to the stock to assist Pinder in
obtaining funds to meet his commitments to the Home
Equipment venture. The agreement was bilateral and
adequate consideration was present to bind Pinder to
perform. (See the undisputed portions of the court's
findings of fact, paragraphs 2, 4, and 5. (R-16, 17, 18, 19)
Pinder became trustee of the contractual right of Lake
to the stock and he cannot avoid his fiduciary or contractual duties to Lake by the spurious argument that
since Pinder saw fit to not cause the stock to issue no
trust could arise and the agreement was without consideration. The citations in appellant's brief a.s to gratuitous agreements to create a trust (appellant's brief, P. 19,
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20, 21, 22) do not apply since not only was the Lake-Pinder agreement bilateral for the reasons set forth above
but if there was no further consideration than the act of
Lake parting with his L. H. & L. stock, the agreement
would be supported by an adequate consideration.
''That a detriment suffered by the promisee
at the promisor's request and as the price for the
promise is sufficient, though the promisor is not
benefitted, is well settled. It will be found that in
most cases where there is a detriment to the promisee there will also be a benefit to the promisor,
because when the promisee does something detrimental to himself at the request of the promisor,
the promisor must be assumed to make the request
because he desired the performance in question
and regarded it as beneficial to himself." (Williston on Contracts, No. 202, at pages 377 and 378.)
The appellant in its brief spends seven pages arguing
that there can be no conversion of the stock since it had
never been issued by the corporation. This argument and
the cases cited in the support have no releYance to this
case. The amended complaint (R-8, 9, 10) and the findings
of fact at no place state that the stock was converted and
the court certainly did not make its determination on this
theory. The theory of recovery pled in the amended
complaint is that Pinder entered into an agreement 'Yith
Lake to do the following things:
a) To act as a trustee of Lake's stock in L. H. & L.
Mining Company- and deliYer it to Standard only
'vhen he ra used the issuance of 37,500 shares of
Standard stock to Lake.
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b) To cause the 37,500 shares of stock to issue to
Lake.
c) To hold the Standard stock and sell it for Lake's
benefit.
The court found that he made this agreement and
that he breached it. It is not necessary to even consider
the law of conversion as it might apply to the facts of this
case.
PoiNT

III.

THE DEFENDANT- APPELLANT MADE NO
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND
OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE YET
ATTEMPTS TO PRESENT NEW EVIDENCE TO
THIS COURT ON APPEAL BY AFFIDAVIT AND
ARGUMENT IN HIS BRIEF.

The defendant-appellant urges this court to reverse
the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the
court believed that the legend on the back of two of the
checks given by Pinder to Lake were placed on the checks
after they cleared the bank, and that this was not a fact.
This point cannot properly be considered by this court
on appeal because it has never been properly raised by
the appellant either before the trial court or this court.
The defendant-appellant made a motion for a new
trial on September 21, 1960. The motion was not based
on any "newly discovered evidence" (Rule 59 (a) (4)
lTtah Rules of Civil Procedure), that the trial court was
wrong in its conclusion as to the time of the endorsements nor on the ground of "surprise" (Rule 59 (a) (3)
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) but solely on the ground
that the ''evidence was insufficient to justify the decision''
and "that the decision is against the law and that there
was an error in applying the law to the evidence introduced." {R-23)
The motion was argued on November 4, 1960, and
while defendant argued that the court's comments with
respect to the endorsements on the checks did not correspond to the facts and stated that he could prove this,
no evidence was offered. On January 16, 1961, two months
after his motion for a new trial had been denied, and
one month after defendant-appellant had filed his notice
of appeal, appellant's attorney filed an affidavit purporting to prove the fact that the endorsement was on
the checks at the time they were given to the plaintiff
and argues this as evidence in his brief on appeal just as
if it was part of the record.
If the defendant's appellant could not have had this
evidence available at the trial Rule 59 (a) (4) permits
him relief to present this new evidence to the Trier of Fact
by making a motion under this rule provided the motion
is supported by affidavit as required by Rule 59 (c).
No such motion "\\"as ever made by
. the defendant-appellant. Even though he had from September 14, 1960,
to November 4, 1960, to obtain the alleged evidence he
made no offer to the trial court and then after his motion
for a new trial had been denied for two months he :filed an
affidavit on J anua.ry 16, 1961, attempting to put this
evidence into the record. It ""ould indeed be a novel rule of
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procedure that would permit a litigant to introduce new
evidence for the first time on appeal having failed to
even make a motion for a new trial based on newly diseovered evidence.

IV.
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED THE
PLAINTIFF THE HIGHEST MARKET PRICE OF
THE STOCK FROM THE TIME OF REFUSAL TO
DELIVER THE STOCK TO WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME THEREAFTER.
PoiNT

At the trial of this action the evidence showed that in
th month of April, 1958, the defendant, Robert J. Pinder, a trustee of securities owned by the plaintiff, induced
the plaintiff to execute what in effect were stock powers
on the representation that the defendant desired to sell
certain stock owned by him in order to raise money to
put into a joint venture between the two parties, and
agreed that either the plaintiff's stock, if used, would be
replaced by stock of the defendant's or that the defendant would cause other stock to be issued to the purchasers,
but in any event that the defendant would carry out his
trust obligation to hold the 37,500 shares of stock to which
the plaintiff was entitled and to sell the same for the benefit of the plaintiff. The evidence further shows that the
defendant continuously promised that the 37,500 shares
of stock would be issued to the plaintiff, and periodically
advised the plaintiff that the stock had in fact been
issued. The plaintiff in the fore part of June, 1958, made
demand upon the defendant for the stock, and the defendant then failed to deliver the stock.
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The plaintiff respectfully submits that the measure
of damages to be awarded the plaintiff in this action is
the highest market value of the stock from the time of
refusal of the defendant to deliver the stock to the plaintiff in June of 1958 to within a reasonable time thereafter.
The question was considered in the case of Western
Securities Co. v. Silver King Consolidated Mirving Co.,
57 Utah 88, 192 Pac. 664. In that case the stock was delivered to the defendant pursuant to a pledge agreement
on the 20th day of February, 1914. The stock instead of
being held was transferred and converted, and the lower
court found that the failure to hold the stock as security
and the act of transferring it upon delivery constituted a
conversion of the stock. On appeal the question was raised
as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to the value of
the stock at the date of conversion or to the higher value
at a time some months subsequent to the conversion. In
discussing this question the court set forth the following
rule:
"If it be assumed, however, that the sale was void
and that appellant 'vas guilty of conversion of the
stock, the judgment is, nevertheless, contrary· to
law. The ordinary rule goYerning the measure of
damages in cases "There the pledgee "~rongfully
converts property pledged is the market Yalue of
the property pledged, "Tith interest from the time
it was conYerted. If the pledged property consists of stocks or bonds of a fluctuating market
price, then the measure of damages, under the
New York rule, is the highest market price of
such stocks or bonds 'vithin a reasonable time
after the pledgor obtained notice of the sale of
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ern Securities Co. v. Silver King Consolidated
Mining Co., 192 Pac. 664 to p. 672.)
This rule was also followed by the Federal Court in
the case of Nephi Processing Co. v. Talbott, 247 Fed. 2d
771. In this case the item converted happened to be turkeys delivered to the defendant. The question raised
before the appellate court was whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to the value at the date of conversion or
the highest market value within a reasonable time after
the conversion. The lower court granted the plaintiff
an instruction that the plaintiff was entitled to the highest market value and the defendant appealed on the
ground that this instruction was in error and that the
court should have instructed that the measure of damages was the value of the turkeys on the date of
conversion. The court determined the question in the
following language:
''The Utah courts have recognized that as a general rule the measure of damages for conversion
of property is the value of the property at the
time of the conversion, plus interest. . . . It has
been held, however, that the rule has no application where the converted chattels are of a kind
which have a fluctuating value. In such cases the
measure of damages is the highest market price
of the property within a reasonable time after
the O\vner has notice of the conversion. Restatement I~aw of Restitution, Par. 151 (c) ; 53 Am.
Jur., Trover and Conversion, Sec. 99, Gallagher
v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193, 9 Supeme Court 335, 32
La\v Ed. 658, Newberger Cotton Co. vs. Stevens
167 ..:\rk 275, 267 S. W. 777, 40 A. L. R. 1279 In
Re Solomon, Weed & Co. Inc., 53 Fed. 2d 335, 79
.A.. L. R. 379. See also 40 A. L. R. 1282, 87 A. L. R.
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817. The Utah Supreme Court has accepted this
rule.''
In the Nephi Processing case the conversion of the
turkeys occurred in February of 1954. The court permitted evidence of the highest market value between 54,
55 and 56, and granted the highest market value which
was in December of 1954. In the Lake v. Pinder case it is
difficult to determine exactly when the breach of trust
took place. Certainly there was no denial of the right of
the plaintiff to the stock up to June of 1958 when demand
was made for delivery of the stock. Prior to that time
the defendant had recognized his trust and had assured
the plaintiff that he would carry it out by obtaining the
stock for the benefit of the plaintiff and selling the stock
at the best possible market price for the benefit of the
plaintiff. It was not until June of 1958 that the plaintiff
after repeated assurances and promises from the defendant demanded the stock and the defendant failed
to deliver it.
Under the above cited cases the appropriate measure
of damages to be applied is the highest market value from
June of 1958 until the time of trial which was at least
$2.50 per share. See Exhibits 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. The
witness, Kay Ralph Bowman, sold stocks at $2.50 per
share in l\Iay, 1959 (R-93). Gus & Stead, brokers, traded
large amounts as shown by their records. The National
Quotations exceeded $2.50 per share.
The court treated the trust agreement as breached
as of the time of the transaction with 1\IcGee and Witherspoon in April, 1958, and fixed the damages as of that
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time when there was only a $.30 per share market for the
stock. This was in error since until June there was actually no refusal on the part of Pinder to carry out the
agreement; in fact, he constantly promised to do so. The
damages therefore should have been the highest market
value from June, 1958, until a reasonable time thereafter,
which under the rule of Nephi Processing Co. v. Talbott,
247 Fed. 2d 771, would be at least a year thereafter. During this period the stock traded nationally at a high of in
excess of $2.50 per share. We submit the judgment should
be increased to reflect the correct measure of damages.
CONCLUSION
The court correctly found a breach of the trust
agreement by the defendant-appellant but erred in determining the measure of damages.
The trial court's judgment as to liability should be
affirmed and the error of the trial court in fixing the
damages should be corrected to award the plaintiff-respondent the highest market value of the stock within a
reasonable time after the breach which was $2.50 per
share for the 31,500 shares.
Respectfully submitted
McBROOM & HYDE
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Respondent a.nd
Cross-Appellant
315 East Second South
401 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

